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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-EVIDENCE OBTAINED
DURING SEARCH SUPPRESSED
Defendant stored illegally obtained narcotics in his aunt's apartment. Police
searched the apartment without a warrant and seized this contraband. Hold: The
seizure of the narcotics was a violation of defendant's constitutional rights guaran-
teed by the Fourth Amendment and the evidence must, therefore, be suppressed.
Jeffers v. United.States 187 F. 2d 498 (D. C. Cir. 1950); afld.-U. S.--, 20 U.
S. L. Week 4011 (Nov. 13, 1951).
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution states: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Warrants must then be obtained unless the circumstances of the search or
seizure are for some reason considered exceptional. There are two general areas
where a warrant is traditionally unnecessary. One is where the search is carried
on as incident to a valid arrest Mc Donald v. U. S. 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Harris
v. U. S., 331 U. S. 145 (1947); the other where there is an emergency with the
attendant possibility of the removal of the goods. Carroll v. U. S. 267 U. S. 132
(1925), Johnson v. U. S. 333 U. S. 10 (1948). In the principal case there was
no valid arrest, nor were there any grounds for considering the situation one of
emergency.
It follows, necessarily, that the search was illegal but does tfiis afford defend-
ant the remedy which he asks for? Weeks v. U. S. 232 U. S. 383 (1914) enunci-
ated the rule that the standing to object to illegal seizure of evidence was a personal
one. This has now become a part of the Fed. R. Crim. P. P. 41 (e) which states
that it is only the "person aggrieved" who can move to suppress the evidence.
Here the defendant claims no ownership in the premises and therefore cannot
complain of the illegality of the search. The problem was whether he could
complain of the illegality of the seizure i.e., did he have ownership of the prop-
erty seized?
It is provided in 38 Star. 785, 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 2558 (a) (1914) that
narcotics shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture. 53 Stat. 362, 26 U. S. C. A.
sec. 3116 (1935) states that no property rights shall exist in any liquor or property
intended for use in violating the internal revenue law, but this section also provides
that warrants shall issue for the seizure of such property. This provision for the
issuance of a warrant was one indication to the court that the Fourth Amendment
safeguards apply to contraband seized as well as to other property. As additional
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support for defendant's claim, ownership in the government is not established with-
out a forfeiture proceeding. 53 Stat 457, 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 3730 (a) (1) and
3721; 53 Star. 460, 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 3745 (a) (1939).
The dissent cited dictum in Harris v. U. S. supra to the effect "If entry upon
the premises be authorized and the search which follows be valid, there is nothing
in the Fourth Amendment which inhibits the seizure by law-enforcement agents
of government property the possession of which is a crime, even though the officers
are not aware that such property is on the premises when such search is initiated"
as authority for not suppressing the evidence in the principal case. However, in
the Harris case the police had a warrant for the defendant's arrest and the search
was thus incident to a valid arrest This brings the case within one of the above-
mentioned exceptions to the necessity for a search warrant.
A more difficult case to reconcile with the present decision is Gibson v. U. S.
149 F 2d 381 D. C Cir. (1945). There, as here, a warrantless search was con-
ducted on premises in which the defendant claimed no ownership but narcotics on
defendant's person were seized. The court held that this constituted a continuing
crime in the presence of officers. If looked at in conjunction with the present case,
a motion for the suppression of evidence will be granted defendant if he claims
ownership in narcotics but is not present when they are seized. On the other
hand the motion will be denied if they are on his person.
From the point of view of the history and purposes for which the Amendment
was adopted this decision would appear to be correct The underlying purpose for
the enactment of the Amendment was stated in Boyd v. U. S. 116 U. S. 616
(1885) when the court said it is not the breaking of doors that constitutes the
offese, but the invasion of personal security, liberty, and property. In Weeks v.
U. S. supra the court stated that praiseworthy as attempts to bring the criminal to
justice are, they are not worth the sacrifice of principles which have been turned
into fundamental law. Personal liberty appears to be a jealously guarded value
and worth the risk of a few petty criminals being aided through misfeasance of
law officers.
In the instant case it would apparently have been a simple matter to obtain
a warrant. Instead the officer entered an apartment illegally and seized a package to
which defendant had, at least, a claim of ownership. The court allowed defend-
ant a remedy for this invasion of his privacy. It is submitted that this is more
in keeping with the purposes for which the amendment was adopted than the
decision in the Gibson case supra, or the dictum in the Harris case, supra.
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